WHEREAS, James C. Driscoll, III (“Driscoll”), at all times relevant to this matter, was a director of Newtown Savings Bank, a Connecticut bank, and, as such, was a “related person” within the meaning of C.G.S. § 36a-53(a)(1);

WHEREAS, the Commissioner, through the Financial Institutions Division of the Department of Banking, conducted an investigation pursuant to C.G.S. § 36a-17(a) into the activities of Driscoll to determine whether he engaged in conduct that may warrant the Commissioner taking any action within the Commissioner’s jurisdiction;

WHEREAS, as a result of such investigation, the Commissioner alleges that Driscoll violated C.G.S. § 36a-263, which forms the basis for removing Driscoll from office pursuant to C.G.S. § 36a-53(b)(1)(A) and imposing a civil penalty pursuant to C.G.S. § 36a-53(d) and § 36a-50(a);

WHEREAS, as a result of such investigation, the Commissioner further alleges that Driscoll violated C.G.S. § 36a-53b(3), which forms the basis for removing Driscoll from office pursuant to C.G.S. § 36a-53(b)(1)(A) and imposing a civil penalty pursuant to C.G.S. § 36a-53(d) and § 36a-50(a); 

WHEREAS, as a result of such investigation, the Commissioner further alleges that Driscoll engaged in an unsafe and unsound practice in connection with a bank, which forms the basis for removing Driscoll from office pursuant to C.G.S. § 36a-53(b)(1)(C) and imposing a civil penalty pursuant to C.G.S. § 36a-53(d) and § 36a-50(a);

WHEREAS, as a result of such investigation, the Commissioner further alleges that Driscoll used his position in a manner contrary to the interest of a bank, which forms the basis for removing Driscoll from office pursuant to C.G.S. § 36a-53(b)(1)(E) and imposing a civil penalty pursuant to C.G.S. § 36a-53(d) and § 36a-50(a);

WHEREAS, as a result of such investigation, the Commissioner further alleges that Driscoll has been negligent in the performance of his duties, which forms the basis for removing Driscoll from office pursuant to C.G.S. § 36a-53(b)(1)(F);

WHEREAS, an administrative proceeding initiated under C.G.S. § 36a-53 would constitute a “contested case” within the meaning of C.G.S. § 4-166(2);  

WHEREAS, C.G.S. § 4-177(c) and § 36a-1-55(a) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provide that a contested case may be resolved by consent order, unless precluded by law;

WHEREAS, both the Commissioner and Driscoll acknowledge the possible consequences of formal administrative proceedings, and Driscoll voluntarily agrees to consent to the entry of the Sanction described below without admitting or denying any allegation set forth herein and solely for the purpose of obviating the need for further formal administrative proceedings concerning the allegations set forth herein;

WHEREAS, Driscoll agrees to the language of this Consent Order;

AND WHEREAS, Driscoll, through his execution of this Consent Order, voluntarily agrees to waive his procedural rights, including a right to notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the allegations set forth herein, and voluntarily waives his right to seek judicial review or otherwise challenge or contest the validity of this Consent Order.

CONSENT TO ENTRY OF SANCTIONS

WHEREAS, Driscoll, through his execution of this Consent Order, consents to the Commissioner’s entry of a Consent Order imposing the following sanction:

1. Commencing on the date that this Consent Order is executed by Driscoll, Driscoll may not, without the consent of the Commissioner, hold any position as a director, officer, employee or independent contractor with any bank, Connecticut credit union or federal credit union, as defined in C.G.S. § 36a-2, or with a holding company that holds a subsidiary that is a bank, as defined in C.G.S. § 36a-2; or as a licensee or registrant under C.G.S. Titles 36a or 36b. 

CONSENT ORDER

NOW THEREFORE, the Commissioner enters the following:

1. The Sanction set forth above be and is hereby entered;
    
2. Upon issuance of this Consent Order by the Commissioner, this matter will be resolved and the Commissioner will not take any future enforcement action against Driscoll based upon the allegations set forth herein; provided that issuance of this Consent Order is without prejudice to the right of the Commissioner to take enforcement action against Driscoll based upon a violation of this Consent Order or the matters underlying its entry, if the Commissioner determines that compliance with the terms herein is not being observed or if any representation made by Driscoll and reflected herein is subsequently discovered to be untrue; and
    
3. This Consent Order shall become final when issued.

So ordered at Hartford, Connecticut
this 3rd day of December 2013.                ____________/s/_____________
                                                           Howard F. Pitkin
                                                           Banking Commissioner